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1 Introduction 
When environmental issues are at stake, analysis often focuses on the way renewable 
resources are managed or mismanaged by local people. Adams (1990) showed that the 
respective discussions centred in the past on the issue of mismanagement and led to 
initial approaches to environmental conservation – approaches that were biased by the 
view that local inhabitants in so-called Third World countries are at the centre of the 
problem. Or to put it polemically: While white men in Africa were hunters, Africans 
were regarded as poachers (ibid). Other studies on Africa take the view, for example, 
that forests are being cut down by a growing population extending their agricultural 
production (see Fairhead and Leach 1996). Most of these works draw attention to colo-
nial bias, which was still dominant among resource use planners until the 1990s.  
Perhaps one of the most important contributions to the view that local inhabitants ruin 
their resource base was the article by Garret Hardin entitled the “Tragedy of the Com-
mons,” published in 1968. In this work, the links between resource management and 
institutions are important, for the article focuses on a crucial issue regarding sustainable 
resource management, i.e. property rights. Hardin attacked the property rights regime – 
a regime found largely in Third World countries – which he called common property. 
For Hardin, common property resources were free or open access resources: no one 
feels responsible to look after the regeneration of a resource such as a pasture (or a 
fishing ground, forest, wildlife population, etc.) as long as it does not belong to him or 
her personally. Even more problematic for Hardin was the fact that people who restrain 
themselves from maximum use of a resource in order to let it regenerate are on the 
losing side: there will always be other users consuming as much as they can, and the 
“conservationists” will be left with nothing. This constellation is the “prisoner’s di-
lemma” in game theory, in which even those who want to conserve the resource base 
go for maximum use. Hardin perceived this as the tragedy, for he did not see a way out 
for local users. He saw them as unable to create rules – institutions – to regulate re-
source use at a level that does not lead to resource destruction. For him, the only solu-
tion was in the control of common property resources by a central government or – as 
advocated by neoclassical economists – transformation of the commons into private 
property (Acheson 1989, Feeney et al. 1990). The tragedy bias was already present in 
colonial discourse and was actually bundled by Hardin. But it led many governments to 
take resource rights and responsibilities out of the hands of local groups and to legiti-
mise this move by pointing out that existing overuse of forests, wildlife, fisheries and 
pastures was the result of this tragedy.  
Many authors subsequently showed that Hardin had misinterpreted common property 
as an open access system, and they demonstrated that cases where resources were not 
part of any property system (i.e. open access) were indeed very rare. Most of the time 
resources scattered over wide ranges, and not concentrated in one spot, are owned by a 
local groups, village groups, lineages, or kinship groups. These resources belong to no 
one but the members of a particular group (Acheson 1989). Access was allowed only 
for members of the group, and outsiders who asked permission for access would either 
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receive it or be denied. Anthropological research has also shown that such groups of 
users usually have rules and norms regulating the amount of consumption of resources 
(time scales, quotas, technical regulations, etc). Additionally, there are monitoring and 
sanctioning boards (councils of elders, priests, young men, i.e. warrior age classes). 
Close face-to-face interaction in a small-scale society, where social control is every-
where, can also be regarded as a monitoring and sanctioning device.  
It then becomes an important and very interesting task to determine in a particular 
community how local resources were and still are governed by what the present paper 
refers to as institutions – regulatory devices that define who is allowed to use what kind 
of resource at what time and under what circumstances.  
But the challenge of “overuse syndromes” must also be dealt with, although it can be 
proven that institutions operate in a community or on a larger societal level. It is then 
necessary to show historically – and usually in societies with no written records – what 
kinds of rules operated, for example, to govern the use of pastures, and why such insti-
tutions no longer work today. There are demographic, technological, economic and 
political aspects to be considered in such an analysis. The expansion of the Western 
world in different stages is one of the most important milestones in this analysis. A 
second milestone was the time when colonies allegedly became independent. Newly 
governed entities, in colonial and post-colonial times, had to face new institutions es-
tablished in writing and therefore formalised by state law and controlled by govern-
ments. This dual existence of so-called customary law and government laws and regu-
lations is at the heart of ambivalence and insecurity, where theories of institutions, and 
particularly the New Institutionalism, can provide insights and help mitigate syndromes 
of resource overuse. 
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2 New Institutionalism: 
Methodological Individualism and 
the Role of Transaction Costs 
The term “New” Institutionalism implies an “Old” school of thought. This is usually 
brought up in connection with economists such as Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell. 
Veblen’s position in particular (see Veblen 1919) was that institutions generally play an 
important role in economic actions, but he never clearly defined this role. His position 
seems to be more an assumption that rules in a society are important for economic de-
cisions, and that the portrait of the individual “Economic Man” must be rejected, as it 
does not explain economic evolution and technological transformation. Generally, in-
dividual conduct is shaped by relations of an institutional nature, by means of which 
Veblen suggested an alternative to the theory of the rational individual being able to 
calculate everything (Hodgson 1993). But the role of institutions in the decisions of 
actors was never systematically presented by the old school of institutionalism (ibid).  
An initial step towards a new approach to institutions can be found in Ronald Coase’s 
theory of the firm (Coase 1937). Coase tried to show why this form of capitalist eco-
nomic organisation was important. In the structure of a firm, transactions are organized 
by rules, at costs lower than the costs that would ensure if each and every individual 
member of the working force were to be hired separately (the role transaction costs 
play in the new theory will be discussed later).  
To put the New Institutionalism in a general theoretical context to explain patterns of 
resource use, the focus must be on two important points: methodological individualism 
and the role of transaction costs. 
Platteau’s explanations of the first point are useful and put the New Institutionalism 
into a wider perspective (Platteau 2000). When Karl Marx was examining institutions 
in terms of the dialectical interplay of productive forces and production, enumerating in 
the latter property arrangements such as institutional rules for property rights assign-
ments, he placed them at a societal level. In the contradiction between productive 
forces and these institutional relations, adjustments are made in a process by which 
change takes place in the form of a revolution. In this way, social rules are newly de-
fined but expressed in material terms as a productive force. Boserup (1965) also em-
phasises population growth by showing that, even in pre-capitalist societies, growth did 
not lead to a decline in agrarian output. On the contrary, she argues, it led to the use of 
intensified techniques and new institutional arrangements. With population growth, 
more intensive patterns of land use are employed, even in pre-capitalist systems. Thus 
it is no surprise that in an agrarian system with annual cropping, private property rights 
relating to land are found, while in long-fallow agriculture this is not the case (Boserup 
1965, Platteau 2000).  
For Marx and Boserup, the view is a collective one, but this is not the case with the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), as expressed by one exponent of New Institution-
alist thought. Platteau states that NIE provides “bourgeois” answers to Marxist ques-
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tions. NIE shares with Marx the view that institutions are useful at one point in time but 
come into conflict during future developments. NIE assumes that it is not the supra-
individual level that is important; rather, analysis needs to be done at the individual 
level. So for NIE and for other New Institutionalists as well, the basic assumption is 
that the individual is rational, sometimes rationally bounded, and is a self-interested 
actor who attempts to secure his/her outcome. However, this does not bring us back to 
the old neo-classical point of view. What is of interest in the action-choice framework 
of NIE is the idea that individuals seek the best possible outcome, and institutional 
change comes about through the aggregation of decisions taken by bounded rational 
actors (North 1990, Ensminger 1992, Gibson 1999, Platteau 2000). Given her micro-
economic foundation, Boserup is closer to the NIE than Marx (Platteau 2000). 
The ways in which such institutions evolve and change, and the influence they have on 
the economic strategies of individuals and groups of actors, are issues debated by dif-
ferent theories in economic history, political science and anthropology. Different ap-
proaches can be subsumed under the label of New Institutionalism (Olson 1965, North 
and Thomas 1973, North, 1981, 1990, Ostrom 1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998, Broomley 
1992, Becker and Ostrom 1995, Ruttan 1998, Gibson 1999). Institutions are seen here 
as formal and informal “rules of the game,” such as constraints, norms, values and rules. 
These give incentives to groups and individuals, and also structure human action and 
interaction, especially in economic activities, collective action, and in sustainable re-
source use. They help individuals form expectations about the conduct of others and 
thereby enable co-ordination and cooperation. Institutions such as property rights sys-
tems or laws are developed by the state (formal institutions) or by local communities, 
where they are embedded in their culture (informal institutions; North 1990, Ostrom 
1990, Ensminger 1992, 1998).  
An important aspect in explaining how institutions operate is illustrated by the work of 
economists such as Douglass North (1990). He not only states that institutions matter for 
economic activities (Old Institutionalism), but that if they work properly, they reduce 
transaction costs. These are the costs that arise when two people engage in an economic 
transaction, which is, as Ronald Coase (1937) has shown, costly. To make a transaction, 
one has to have information about product quality and about the behaviour of other actors. 
One also has to monitor trading partners and sanction them when they cheat. All these 
activities are costly because they consume time and resources (North 1990). 
In the case of the management of common property resources (CPR), Ruttan (1998) 
shows another interesting aspect focusing on the gains arising from co-operative insti-
tutions: She establishes the hypothesis that CPR institutions follow the principle of 
“restraint for gain”. If users are able to agree on what rules should be operative, it be-
comes possible to take advantage of such renewable resources as fish stocks when they 
are well developed and, therefore, most profitable. Because of this, very good fish 
catches can be enjoyed at low costs. The primary condition for this is the efficient func-
tioning of rules. Two forms are principally responsible for the development of co-
operative rules, as seen in CPR institutions: CPR institutions can develop under the rule 
of reciprocity (“reciprocal altruism”) or under a form of asymmetrical power relations 
(“asymmetric reciprocity”). In “reciprocal altruism” the different actors can profit from 
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co-operation, for example, if they allow access to the resource by foreign users, be-
cause at a later time they may be able to benefit from the resources of those foreign 
users. “Asymmetrical altruism” refers to co-operation in an unbalanced situation of 
power relations. In this situation, co-operation may be extended by the side with less 
power, even when the party on this side benefits less than the stronger side, because the 
benefit is still greater than when there is no co-operation at all. In this context, the focus 
is on power relationships. As a result, power relations are a major research issue. 
The interesting thing about looking at this theory in analysing CPR management is the 
fact that it raises questions about other theories long thought to be true. In the debate on 
common property and sustainability, the notion of Garret Hardin’s “Tragedy of the 
Commons” paradigm mentioned above (Hardin 1968) is actually undermined by a 
close look at how CPR institutions operate. Elinor Ostrom’s work illustrates this by 
analysing different CPR institutions and their management by local communities all 
over the world. Examination of successfully operating, locally developed institutions 
that use natural resources such as forests, irrigation water, fisheries and pastures in 
sustainable ways resulted in the development of eight design principles (DPs) for effec-
tive institutions (see Box below). 
 
Clearly defined boundaries 
 The boundaries of resource systems (e.g. groundwater, basins or forests)  
and the individuals or households with rights to harvest resource products  
are clearly defined. 
 
Proportional equivalence between costs and benefits  
 Rules specifying the amount of resource products allocated to a user are  
related to local conditions and to rules requiring labour, materials and/or  
inputs of money. 
 
Collective choice arrangements 
 Most individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in  
the group who can modify these rules. 
 
Monitoring 
 Monitors, who actively audit physical conditions and user behaviour, are at  
least partially accountable to the users and/or are users themselves. 
 
Graduated sanctions 
 Users who violate rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending  
on the seriousness and context of the offence) from the users, from officials  
accountable to these users, or from both. 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve  
conflict among users or between users and officials. 
 
Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
 The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external  
governmental authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource. 
 
Nested enterprises (for resources that are part of larger systems) 
 Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and  
 governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Becker and Ostrom 1995:119 from Ostrom 1990:56f. 
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All these design principles can actually be included in the notion of transaction costs. If 
CPR institutions operate properly, they in fact reduce these costs. 
But Ostrom clearly shows that the DPs are not universal rules that guarantee success in 
all situations. Moreover, these are principles to be adapted to local conditions. In an 
article published with Dustin Becker (Becker and Ostrom 1995), Ostrom argues that 
institutional diversity found among local communities is often better adapted to the 
variability and insecurities in chaotic ecosystems (e.g. changes in fish stock populations) 
than strategies based on biological-mathematical models.1  
Additionally, two of Becker and Ostrom’s eight aspects (regarded as important for the 
building up of new institutions) are particularly relevant: 
• Do the actors involved have common or different interests (homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of interests)? 
• How do actors value the future in respect to the resource in question? Or 
to put it differently, is current resource use more important than future use 
(low or high discounting rate for the future)? 
Economic heterogeneity and high discounting rates for the future make it very difficult 
to establish long-term CPR institutions for sustainable use, as it is much more difficult 
to act collectively and develop rules for sustainable resource use in situations where 
everyone pursues their own interests. Additionally, when there are high discounting 
rates for the future, rational users seek to use up a resource as fast as possible, because 
what remains is immediately used by others. In this situation, the value of preserving 
resources for later use is close to zero. These two aspects lead to overuse of renewable 
resources (Becker and Ostrom 1995). 
There has been some criticism of this approach, centring especially on methodological 
individualism, its formalistic aspects, and its blindness to historical and social context. 
This criticism comes form scientists who deal with evolutionary economics (Nelson 
1995) and from development studies that address problems of participation such as the 
“New Tyranny” (see Cleaver 2001).  
Cleaver points out that the rational choice theorem of methodological individualism is 
not suited for an analysis that helps to solve problems of participation in development. 
This point seems unjustified, as Cleaver’s work and the well-formulated criticism of 
participatory approaches show. The critical factor in development projects is the incen-
tive (be it economic, political, social, psychological or so-called “cultural”) an individ-
ual has in relation to his/her position in the community or society. To study this care-
fully is one of the aims of the New Institutionalism.  
                                                     
1 There is much debate on the concept of maximum sustainable yield in fisheries, because it is extremely 
difficult to define the maximum catch without overusing the fish stock. This is due to the fact that one is 
unable to predict the exact fish population size, as it depends on the complex interactions in ecosystems 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995). Ostrom and Becker argue that it is therefore much better to analyse local 
strategies of resource use before making recommendations to local people (ibid.). 
New Institutionalism: 
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Secondly, it is difficult to grasp Cleaver’s critique of Ostrom’s approach to institutions. 
As Cleaver understands it, Ostrom opts for a formalisation of institutions that can have 
negative effects, for example, by excluding those who are unable to participate in a 
development project for financial reasons or for reasons relating to their household 
workforce. An additional criticism is that only formal institutions (the state or a devel-
opment corporation) are the solution to the problem. However, Ostrom goes beyond 
drawing lessons from successful cases all over the world that do not merely rely on the 
“formal” side of institutions. On the contrary, she stresses that so-called informal insti-
tutions embedded in a specific culture are as successful as formal ones, or even more 
successful. Additionally, she opts for recognition of local and indigenous knowledge of 
resource flows. Cleaver is right in regard to the first principle – clear boundaries – 
when he maintains that these sometimes cannot be as clearly defined as Ostrom’s work 
suggests, especially when considering changes in resource flows from one season to 
another. But this can be easily incorporated in the approach, as will be demonstrated by 
the example of African floodplain wetlands (see below). Additionally, it is clear that 
distinctions between “formal” and “informal” institutions are delicate; traditional (and 
some would say informal) institutions can be as formalised or even more formalised 
than institutions built up by the state. But this critique has also already been incorpo-
rated in the analysis of examples (see below).  
Thirdly, the author of the present paper does not agree with the critique that the ap-
proach makes no reference in historical and social processes. As demonstrated in the 
next chapter, one major contribution to the approach draws on a historical analysis. The 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) as developed by Douglass North (1990) definitely 
has a historical approach, as North is known for his work in economic history. This in 
turn is the basis for the important work of the American anthropologist Jean Ensminger, 
who has attempted to define a new institutional economic anthropology where institu-
tional change is the major focus.  
It must be stressed here, however, that Cleaver does not go into these theories, as only 
Ostrom is cited, but the approach criticised definitely has more to offer. While the au-
thor agrees strongly with the points Cleaver raises against a simplistic participatory 
approach in development – for example, a meeting is not yet a real sign of participation 
in a development project, nor is frequency of speaking up in a meeting – a well-
understood New Institutionalism can actually provide answers to the pitfalls of partici-
pation as a New Tyranny (the title of the publication where Cleaver’s article can be 
found). Much interesting research has been done using this approach; for example, the 
article by Benjaminsen (1997) on decentralisation in Mali, and the publication by Ve-
nema and van den Breemer (1999) on negotiated co-management of natural resources 
in Africa. These publications present cases of successful development as well as unsuc-
cessful cases leading to overuse of natural resources. 
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3 Theories of Institutional Change 
In her book Making a Market, Ensminger presents analytical tools for discussing con-
stellations of overuse of resources and conflicts from an NIE perspective. Ensminger 
has worked among the Orma, a semi-sedentarized pastoralist group in Kenya 
(Ensminger 1992). She looks at changes which were (and still are) taking place among 
the Orma as a group and deals with the incentives of the different families and indi-
viduals due to a market economy and changes in political, economic and social institu-
tions. When analysing change, Ensminger states that one has to look at the individual 
motivations of different actors and delve into the social constraints and incentives that 
influence what people are striving for.  
There is, for Ensminger, interaction among the endogenous aspects of a society in 
which individuals live, composed of institutions, ideology, organisation and bargain-
ing power (see Diagram 1). Ideology consists of the way people explain the world and 
their values. Institutions, as Douglass North (1990) sees it, are the “rules of the game” 
in a society, the formal and informal rules, values, norms and constraints, which pro-
vide incentives for individual action and reliability. Institutions enable co-operation. Or-
ganisation refers to a body in which people organise themselves and act collectively. 
Bargaining power means the ability of an actor to get something he or she wants from 
someone. But this is a bargaining process. The bargaining power of individuals can come 
from social status, wealth or the ability to manipulate ideology (Ensminger 1992: 5-7). 
These four endogenous spheres (ideology, institutions, organisation and bargaining 
power) influence one another and are themselves influenced by external factors. These 
external factors are the social and physical environment (changes in the socio-political 
structure and natural environment), population (demographic changes) and technology 
(technological changes), which together influence so-called “relative prices.” By this 
term Ensminger means externally influenced changes in prices for goods in relation to 
other goods (for example, a rise in cattle or fish prices compared to other goods). In the 
case of the Orma, lower transportation and communication costs have opened up more 
possibilities to trade cattle due to closer markets and slaughter-houses, and also brought 
higher prices for cattle. Ensminger speaks of relative prices because the decision taken by 
an individual depends on the value of a good in relation to another good. 
Understanding Institutions and Their Links to  
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Figure 1: Modelling change  
Source: Jean Ensminger (Ensminger 1992:10) 
 
But on a larger scale as well, the author would incorporate in this notion changes in the 
political and economic environment (pacification, new urban centres and new markets, 
monetarisation), state control (laws, police, administrators), and infrastructure and 
transport systems (lowering costs for marketing or access by other groups, etc.).  
In discussing these processes, economists and anthropologists differ. Economists tend 
to regard institutions as constant while concentrating on the aspect of change in exoge-
nous factors such as relative prices and the outcome of individual behaviour. But an-
thropologists, when referring to change, tend to see relative prices as given and focus 
on institutions when explaining economic action. Ensminger suggests alternating be-
tween the two poles, where both sides influence each other. The demographic-
environmental-technological variables influence relative prices, which change the en-
dogenous variables. These variables influence aspects of distribution and individual 
socio-economic behaviour, which leads to exogenous variables by way of a feedback 
loop. One needs to see where the individual stands and which structures influence 
his/her motivation, and his/her relative bargaining power from case to case. Ensminger 
shows that individuals who gain more bargaining power in a changed situation also 
change the institutions, eradicate them, or create new ones (Ensminger 1992, 
Ensminger and Knight 1997). In agreement with Douglass North, she does not argue 
that the best institutions are always selected, but rather that those that survive are those 
which usually serve the people with the most bargaining power. 
Ensminger shows how pastures held as common property among the Orma are being 
transformed into private property. Before this process of “dismantling a pastoral com-
mons” occurred (Ensminger), the council of elders and the sedentary local population 
were unable to keep the pastures from being used by nomadic pastoralists (nomadic 
Orma and Somali with their cattle). The reason for this was heterogeneity of interests 
among the sedentary village group due to different economic interests. Some of the 
villagers benefited from the nomads by obtaining cattle and milk, while others did not. 
The village group was thus unable to come to an agreement or to monitor the pasture 
collectively. In this situation, pastures were increasingly privatised and the power to 
Ideology Institutions
Organisation
Population
Technology
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prices
Social/Pol/
Economic
Behavior
Distributional
Effects
Bargaining
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Environment
Social / Physical
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exclude outsiders was taken from the council of elders and given to the government-
selected chief, who had good contacts with the state and its forces and thus had much 
more bargaining power than the elders (Ensminger 1992). 
It is this last aspect which is very important for research on resource management is-
sues using the New Institutionalism. How is bargaining power changed or newly dis-
tributed by changes in relative prices in a specific area of resource use such as CPR 
situations? Is it true that users with greater bargaining power stemming from their po-
litical or financial power (locally or through governmental institutions) are able to pri-
vatise former CPRs or manipulate the institutions that govern access to CPRs? Addi-
tionally, it will be interesting to see what kind of strategies former users who lost their 
CPRs will pursue. According to our hypothesis, they will seek scarcer resources, over-
use resources, or act violently against outsiders in order to gain more bargaining power 
(Moorehead 1989, Thomas 1996). 
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4 An Illustrative Example: 
Institutions and Institutional Change 
in African Floodplains  
In order to illustrate the theoretical approach of the New Institutionalism, an example 
of a research project on African Floodplain wetlands, initiated under NCCR/IP6 (Live-
lihood strategies and institutions) is given here. The project incorporates research and 
analysis on five floodplain wetlands in Africa (Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Botswana) from which two research areas are included in this NCCR (the Waza-
Logone-Area in northern Cameroon and the Pangani and Rufiji River areas inTanzania). 
For the purpose of this paper, examples are drawn from cases in Mali and Nigeria:  
Traditional institutions in African floodplain wetlands 
Several IUCN reports regard African wetlands as ecosystems of major importance for 
protection and conservation. Wetlands harbour resources that are very important for a 
large number of ethnic groups differentiated by their economies. This project focuses 
on so-called inland wetlands in semi-arid areas (Stevenson and Frazier 1999:12), which 
are found in floodplains (Hughes and Hughes 1992). Regions like the Internal Niger 
Delta in Mali, the Okavango Delta in Botswana, but also floodplains like the Hadejia-
Jama’ra in Nigeria, the Logone and Chari floodplains in Northern Cameroon, the Pan-
gani and Rufiji rivers in Tanzania, and the Kafue Flats in Zambia all offer a highly 
diversified resource base for local communities.  
The Internal Delta of the Niger in Mali, for example, is used differently by peasants, 
agro-pastoralists, nomadic pastoralists, and sedentary and transhumant fishermen 
(Moorehead 1989). The critical ecological variables are the seasonal rains that occur 
partly locally and partly in remoter mountainous areas, feed the rivers, and lead to ris-
ing water levels in these river systems. As a consequence, large areas adjacent to the 
rivers are inundated. These floods, as well as the receding of floods, give the local peo-
ple different access to renewable natural resources such as fish, pastures, wildlife, gath-
ered products, fertile soils, and water for irrigation. The accessibility of these resources, 
which are held as common property by local groups most of the time, can vary from 
year to year. 
Ethnic groups have developed institutions to manage the CPRs in these areas (Moore-
head 1989). Depending on the season, there are rules by which decisions are made, e.g. 
who can have access to which CPRs, who is excluded (rules of access), etc. Those al-
lowed access are able to use an amount of the resource, at a certain time and under 
certain circumstances (rules of use). These rules were developed long before the time 
of the Fulbe ethnic group’s hegemony in the 19th century, although they were formal-
ised by them. Central to the issue of who is allowed to use these CPRs is the question 
of who the “indigenous people” in an area are, and to whom it is possible to give or 
deny access to resources (ibid. 263). Even today the first users of these areas are said to 
be the masters of the earth or the masters of the water. Apart from conducting rituals 
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for local spirits of the land and the water, they have a duty to organise resource alloca-
tion for different user groups and individuals. This often happens in co-operation with a 
council of elders (ibid.: 264f.). 
Due to the seasonal variability of the resources in these regions, different tenure sys-
tems governing the use of resources are important. As mentioned above, most of the 
time these resources are held in common and use is regulated by the common property 
institutions of a local community. But there are situations – such as the flooding of a 
very large area during the rainy season – in which resources such as fish are open ac-
cess resources. In this situation, all users can fish without restriction. It is only when the 
floods recede and the water returns to the river bed and remains in ponds, little lakes 
and swamps, that the fish are again a CPR of neighbouring villages. Wetlands that are 
too small and dry up become private property. The same is the case with individually 
owned fish traps such as differently sized baskets (Thomas 1996). 
These different tenure systems, which match seasonal variation and the accessibility of 
the resources, can best be explained by the so called “economic defendability model” 
developed by Dyson–Hudson and Smith (1978). This model predicts that resources 
used in open access tenure are those that cannot be defended or do not have to be de-
fended because they are a) too scarce, or b) too abundant to be monopolised by a group 
of people collectively. But if the resources can be found locally in more concentrated 
form, they become scarcer and so it is possible to restrain access by other users. There-
fore, CPRs are resources with specific accessibility where it makes more economic 
sense for local actors to bear the defence costs collectively than to leave them in private 
property tenure. Private property would be too expensive due to defence costs. This 
tenure only makes sense if the resources are available in very high concentration. But 
rules of tenure must also be seen in respect to risk and insecurity. Risks in a hazardous 
ecosystem can be addressed by local communities with a CPR tenure system. These sys-
tems offer the users a wide range of access to resources, which can minimise the risk of 
being without resources (so called minimax strategy, in which profit is not maximised but 
a level of food production for subsistence needs is secured). Moreover, rules governing 
the access of foreign user groups can be seen as a minimax strategy in order to reduce 
risk. These rules offer access to CPRs on the basis of reciprocity for some foreign groups 
– if, in times of disaster, foreign groups can gain access to a local user group’s CPRs, 
profiting from the CPRs of the former host in times of need (Thomas 1996). 
Institutional change in African floodplain wetlands 
Moorehead (1989) and Thomas (1996) show the changes taking place in the African 
floodplain areas. During colonial and during post-colonial times, control over and re-
sponsibility for resource management were increasingly taken out of the hands of local 
user groups by the state. In most cases the state now defines the rules of access to CPRs. 
It decides who, when, and how access to resources is given by distributing licences and 
permits to those able to pay the highest price. The state is also responsible for the most 
significant impacts on floodplain ecosystems, with mostly negative consequences for 
the natural resources and the local population: In many African river systems, dams 
were or are being constructed in order to produce electricity for the cities and to facili-
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tate large irrigation programmes. These activities reduce the water flow into the plains 
normally inundated by the rivers. It is argued that the drastic reduction in resources 
such as fish is connected with low water levels (Loimeier 1986, Moorehead 1989, 
Chabwela 1992, Hollis 1992, Thomas 1996).2 
But there are also other reasons for the massive overuse of CPRs in floodplain wetlands 
and deltas. Monetarisation and commercialisation of resources, as well as institutional 
rules changed by the state or influenced by powerful local and national actors with 
capital, have led to monopoly constellations and the overuse of former CPRs. There are 
massive conflicts between users, too, which could be shaped by ethnicity. These con-
flicts develop because new users from the cities are gaining access to CPRs. This is 
possible due to their financial and political capital, which helps them gain exclusive 
rights of access often guaranteed by the state. As a consequence, overuse of resources 
occurs due to newcomers operating with better fishing technology (motor boats, tighter 
mesh nets, etc.), better guns, or bigger cattle herds. Fish and wildlife are then sold at 
markets and the big cattle herds, which are also sold, overgraze the pastures. These 
resources are no longer available for local communities, making it more and more dif-
ficult for them to cover their subsistence needs. For the most part, local people do not 
have the money to buy food at the local or regional markets. They are forced to switch 
to more marginal resources, which are then overexploited in order to make a living. 
Under these circumstances anger among local CPR users rises. They become willing to 
use violence against the newcomers and against one another in the fight over resources 
that are becoming increasingly scarcer (for cases in Northern Nigeria see Thomas 1996, 
for Mali see Morehead 1989 and Fay 1994, 2000). 
Tension also rises within local communities because adoption of new technologies and 
the possibilities of new market options have led to erosion of the traditional monitoring 
structures and organisations which once ruled the use of the CPRs. Young Somono and 
Bozo fishermen in Mali, for example, who now fish individually with motorboats and 
nylon nets, are no longer forced to co-operate with other people from their fishing 
communities. The lighter nylon nets have made them independent, because no co-
operative work is needed, compared with the older nets in the past, which were heavier. 
The motorboats enable them to travel faster anywhere they want and also to where they 
can sell their catch on the market beyond the control of their village communities or 
elders (Fay 1994, 2000). 
                                                     
2 There are also authors who focus on some of the positive consequences of large dams, like the improved 
regulation of water flows, which reduces variability (Machena 1992, Massinga 1992). But it is important to 
underline that this kind of regulation of flooding does not seem to correspond to the reproductive activities 
of some fish species that depend on the specific time of the flooding of low areas of the floodplains in 
order to spawn. The biological cycle – adapted to some variability – is disrupted by regulated flooding all 
year long, which may result in a lower reproduction rate (Beeler and Frei, personal communication 2001). 
Additionally, Chabwela argues that in the Kafue Flats the two hydroelectric dams of Kafue Gorge (1972) 
and Itezhi-tezhi (1977) have been causing many problems and social costs for local inhabitants. Parts of 
the grazing ground have been lost to weeds. Therefore, cattle herders are now obliged to travel long dis-
tances to the rivers. Most inhabitants living inside the Kafue Flats have been displaced far away and have 
difficulties coping with artificially regulated water regimes. Moreover, they do not benefit from hydroelec-
tric power, which is directed to urban areas (Chabwela 1992: 13-14). 
Understanding Institutions and Their Links to  
Resource Management from the Perspective of New Institutionalism 
22 
Persistence and change in old institutions 
But change in institutions does not always operate in terms of the eradication of older 
rules and values. “Old” traditions can continue to exist under certain circumstances, 
while others vanish totally. But the ones that do not vanish are not necessarily un-
changed. 
The processes of change briefly outlined above in Mali and Nigeria illustrate that lo-
cally developed institutions that were working 40 years ago are not working anymore. 
The reasons are that they have been altered by the powerful and have also been subject 
to a monetarising process (a significant change in relative prices) that changed the insti-
tutional setting in a specific way. The hypotheses which will be tested in the project on 
African floodplain wetlands suggest that traditional institutions that can be monetarised 
will stay in place, while those that impede or hinder adaptation by local users in order 
to earn cash with these resources will be rejected. Cash is needed not only for consumer 
goods in a globalised world, but also for the construction of social networks (marriage, 
etc. See Elwert 1985, 1989, Berry 1989, 1993, Haller 2001).  
An illustration of this process will be offered in conclusion: the Bozo fishermen in Mali 
and monetarisation of the institution known as manga ji. The traditional meaning of 
manga ji is an offering to the Master of the Water in the Bozo group from outside fish-
ermen (a third of their catch, literally translated as “part of the water”) as a compensa-
tion for the Master of the Water, who dealt with the water spirits to maintain order. 
This idea of a traditional institution has been transformed completely. It remains in 
name, but is converted into monetary rent for many people who claim to be tradition-
ally related to this right. This is not only true for the Masters of the Water, but also for 
other individuals and groups, and even the administrators who deal with this notion in 
order to obtain cash. The notion of the manga ji as monetary rent gives way to a stricter 
idea of territoriality as well, which had not been the case in pre-colonial times. This 
notion is fostered by those who are able to gain the most from the commercialisation of 
the fisheries, and therefore those with bargaining power, namely some of the Masters 
of the Water, traders and administrators. 
Competition is taking place at all levels to secure funding, which can be obtained by 
making reference to traditional institutions or to the altered versions of these institu-
tions. The change in the traditional meaning of manga ji clearly illustrates this tendency. 
All that remains of the traditional institutions is the monetary aspect. The original con-
tent and purpose has been erased completely (Fay 1994, 2000). Transformations and 
losses of older institutions can be shown as well in other very different examples such 
as pastoralism in Kenya (Little 1985) or traditional intensive peasantry in the Mandara 
Mountains of Northern Cameroon (Haller 1999, 2000, 2001). In these examples, insti-
tutions that govern access to pastures, maintenance of terraced fields that prevents soil 
erosion, and storage of staple crop sorghum for hazardous times – sometimes embed-
ded in religious beliefs – are given up in favour of short-term monetary gain now es-
sential for social life (for example cash for bride price, school fees for children, health 
stations, clothes, etc.). What is striking about these examples is the fact that other tradi-
tional institutional rules, which favour individuals with more bargaining power in order 
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to get access to cash income, are retained despite the negative impact they have on 
sustainable resource use (Haller 2002). 
Last but not least, it is important to have a close look at the institutional “portfolio” 
available to local actors. It is not only the fact that formal institutions override tradi-
tional ones. They can, of course, when largely transformed, stay at the same level side 
by side, and be used depending on the situation. As Fay (1994, 2000) shows in Mali, 
people can use governmental institutions as a reference if they claim resource rights as 
citizens of a district, while in another situation they may refer to their rights as relatives 
of the Master of the Water of an area. Similarly, Lund (1998) shows among peasants in 
Niger that Islamic state and traditional kinship institutions are chosen by individuals, 
depending on the strategic situation, in order to claim rights to land before a court or on 
a local level. All these aspects involve the notion of ideology brought into the theoreti-
cal framework of the New Institutionalism by Jean Ensminger (1992).  
.
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5 Conclusions 
The present paper presents a summary of the New Institutionalism with regard to 
questions of sustainable resource use and illustrates this with examples. It is far from a 
complete outline of the issue, and must be regarded as a sketchy attempt to enable 
researchers in the NCCR to learn more about this approach. First, from the perspective 
of the New Institutionalism, it is important to analyse the historical context in which 
institutions evolved locally. Secondly, it should be possible with this approach to de-
termine the forces at an individual level which, when aggregated, lead to changes in 
institutions. Thirdly, the important contribution from economists is the fact that they 
have drawn attention to the factor of transaction costs and changes in relative prices. 
Political scientists have drawn attention to the interaction between state and local ac-
tors, and the fact that local-level enforcement, homogeneity of interests, and recogni-
tion of traditional knowledge are crucial in designing new institutions for the sustain-
able use of resources. Anthropologists, however, show the role of bargaining power 
and ideology, represented by religion or social norms. They see bargaining power as a 
possibility for shaping institutional design by the more powerful, due also to changes 
in relative prices. Ideology then plays a major role in new opportunities for legitimis-
ing claims of access to resources and enabling people to switch between different 
ideological settings provided, for example, by competing religions (Islam, Christianity, 
Animism (see Ensminger 1992, Ensminger, J. and Knight J. 1997). The same is true of 
“informal” customary and “formalised” state law (see Lund 1998).  
The author’s own contribution to the issue is the following hypothesis: Some old insti-
tutions persist because they can be adapted to monetary needs. Others, that could play 
a positive role in a sustainable use of natural resources, are eradicated completely 
because they hinder individual access to cash for the powerful in a group and outside a 
group (Haller 2001, 2002).  
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When environmental issues are at stake, analysis of renew-
able resource use frequently focuses on unrestricted use by 
local people who hold them as commons. It is then often 
believed that resources are perceived as free for all, leading 
to the overuse of resources (a “tragedy of the commons”). 
However, critiques of such approaches argue that commons 
are not open access but usually the property of specific 
groups who define and enforce rules and regulations (insti-
tutions) for inclusion and exclusion of resource users. 
 
The present paper considers the theory of New Institution-
alism and how it helps to understand livelihood strategies 
and institutional change with respect to resource manage-
ment (Ostrom 1990, Ensminger 1992, Acheson 2003). As 
an actor-oriented theory applied in economics, political 
science and anthropology, New Institutionalism takes ac-
count of the role of formal and informal institutions (rules, 
norms, values and law) in decreasing or increasing resource 
management transaction costs by creating predictability of 
resource users. The paper argues that this approach is a 
useful tool for discussing livelihood strategies. New Institu-
tionalism looks at the design of locally developed institu-
tions (Ostrom 1990); in a newer version developed within
anthropology, Ensminger focuses more closely on how
bargaining power and ideology are changing due to exter-
nally driven changes in relative prices (Ensminger 1992). To 
illustrate the approach, an example of institutional changes 
in African floodplain wetlands is presented. 
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